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The European Commission’s Proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax: 
 A Critical Assessment 
 
John Grahl and Photis Lysandrou° 
 
Abstract 
A financial activities tax (FAT) and a financial transactions tax (FTT) are the main alternative ways of   
recouping some of the public money used to bail out the financial sector after the great crisis of 2007-8. 
In preparing a common proposal for the European Union, the European Commission initially appeared to 
favour the FAT but then swung its weight behind the FTT in late 2011. Its rationale was that in addition 
to generating revenue this tax could also help to stabilize the financial markets by curbing excessive 
speculative trading. This paper takes a different position. Its central argument is that the FTT would 
amplify rather than dampen market instability by interfering with the functions of important financial 
institutions. Its chief conclusion is that the FAT is superior to the FTT.  
 
Key words: European Commission; financial transactions tax; financial activities tax 
 
 
1.Introduction 
In late September, 2011, the European  Commission proposed that a Financial Transactions Tax 
(FTT) be the preferred method by which European governments should tax their financial 
systems to recoup some of the losses incurred in the financial crisis of 2007-81. Although the 
Commission’s staff also studied the merits of a Financial Activities Tax (FAT), which is a tax 
on the profits and wages of financial institutions rather than a tax on transactions in the financial 
markets, it had finally decided in favour of the FTT on the grounds that it would both generate 
revenue for governments and also help to stabilize the financial markets by curbing trading 
volumes. In arguing that a transactions tax would have a stabilizing effect on the financial 
markets, the Commission in effect made clear its acceptance of a key premise underpinning that 
position, namely, that as all short term trading is purely speculative it can only be central to the 
functions of institutions that are peripheral to the financial system and only peripheral to the 
functions of those institutions that are central to the system.  
 
                                               
°  John Grahl is Professor of European Integration at Middlesex University; Photis Lysandrou is is Research 
Professor in the Department of International Politics, City University.of Global Political Economy at London 
Metropolitan University. 
1  Council directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC; 
Commission Staff Working Paper (28.9.2011);, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment (accompanying 
Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax (28.9.2011) 
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The present paper challenges this premise. While it accepts that a significant amount of short 
term trading in the money and capital markets is speculative and thus potentially destabilizing, it 
also argues that an equally significant amount  constitutes an integral part of the day to day 
activities of commercial banks and asset management firms. Short term trading may have been 
exogenous to the financial intermediation functions of these institutions in previous historical 
periods, but following recent structural changes to capitalist economies it has now become an 
integral part of those functions. In view of the importance of  the commercial banks and 
institutional asset managers to the European financial system, it follows that the introduction of 
a European  FTT that indiscriminately restrains all short term trading would bring about a result 
that is the very opposite of that intended by the Commission. Rather than enhance the ability of 
the European financial system to service the real economy in a stable and cost efficient manner, 
the proposed tax would on the contrary severely undermine that ability. Our central conclusion 
is that it would be far better to allow important financial institutions to perform their functions 
unhindered and then tax any excessive profits made out of the performance of those functions. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section two reviews the reasons behind the 
Commission’s choice of a transactions tax. Section three looks at some accounts of security 
trading. Section four focuses on the effects of a capital market FTT on European asset 
managers. Section five focuses on the effects of a money market FTT on European banks. 
Section six looks at some strategic and policy implications. Section seven concludes. 
 
2. The Rationale for a European FTT 
As a result of the extensive damage to domestic economies and public finances wrought by the 
financial crisis, a number of European governments, in common with those in many other parts 
of the world, introduced special tax measures aimed at making the financial sector bear some of 
the costs of the crisis. Fearing that the lack of coordination of these national measures could 
fragment the European internal market for financial services, the European Council and the 
European Parliament called upon the European Commission to prepare a proposal for a 
common approach to taxing the financial sector2. In response to these calls the Commission 
authorised several studies that compared the relative advantages of two major types of tax 
instrument, the Financial Activities Tax that would be levied on the value added by financial 
institutions and the Financial Transactions Tax that would target trading activity in the financial 
                                               
2  Council of the European Union, 17 June, 2010; Resolution of the European Parliament, March 10, 2010. 
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markets3. Although at one point it looked as though the FAT would be favoured4, the 
Commission finally decided in favour of the FTT on the grounds that not only would this tax be 
marginally more effective in achieving the revenue raising objective but also that it alone would 
be able to achieve the second major objective of “limiting undesirable behaviour and thus 
stabilizing markets” (2011b,p.3).  Central to this conclusion is the identification of ‘undesirable 
behaviour’ with ‘trading behaviour’: while the FTT would have a directly negative impact on 
trading volumes by raising the cost of financial transactions, the FAT would have no equivalent 
impact.  As the Commission’s Impact Assessment states: “The FAT does not have a direct 
impact on the trading behaviour in financial markets” (ibid., p.6)  
 
It has been said that the Commission’s directive on the FTT makes no distinction between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ financial trades5. This is not quite correct. The Commission does appear to 
differentiate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ trades according to whether or not they have some link to 
underlying economic fundamentals. Thus the Commission does not intend to apply the tax on 
primary market transactions “so as not to undermine the raising of capital by governments and 
companies.” (ibid.,p.4). Similarly, the Commission’s logic in advising that the FTT should be 
set at relatively low rates is that it would have no significant impact on low-speed transactions 
connected to real sector activities but a negative impact on high-speed transactions that have no 
such connection. Where there is validity to the criticism that no distinction is made between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ trades is in relation to short term trades in the secondary markets. The 
Commission appears to consider all such trades as ‘bad’ with any differences between them 
merely being differences in the degree to which they are bad. High frequency trading is singled 
out for special attention but the fact that the Commission considers all types of automated 
trading to be speculative is made clear by its intention to apply the FTT to a very wide range of 
financial instruments and institutions (see figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3  EU Commission staff working document, Innovative Financing at a Global Level, (1 April, 2010a); EU 
Commission staff working document, Taxation of the Financial Sector, (7 October, 2010b) 
4  See in particular the EU Commission staff working document, Innovative Financing at a Global Level.  
5  Vella et.al (2011, p.) 
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Figure 1 
The Commission’s Proposed FTT in Outline 
Rate of FTT  0.1% for securities 
 0.01% for derivatives 
Range of Financial 
Instruments Subject 
To FTT 
Range covers all instruments which are negotiable on the capital market, 
money market instruments including repurchase agreements (repos),units or 
shares in collective investment undertakings (including undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and alternative 
investment funds) and derivatives contracts. 
 
Range of Financial 
Institutions Subject to 
FTT 
Range includes investment firms, organised markets, credit institutions, 
insurance and reinsurance undertakings, collective investment undertakings 
and their managers, pension funds and their managers, holding companies, 
financial leasing companies and special purposed entities. 
Residence Principle The FTT applies if one of the parties to a transaction is a financial institution 
that is established in a Member State, where ‘established’ means that the 
financial institution has its registered seat, its permanent address, its usual 
residence or a branch in that Member State. 
 
 
The controversy that has followed the proposal for a European financial transactions tax has 
centred on two broad issues, feasibility and desirability. As regards feasibility, the strong 
objections to the FTT voiced by the British government have served to highlight the risk that if 
Europe proceeds with the FTT without any global agreement to implement the tax a substantial 
proportion of financial trades currently conducted in Europe will be redirected to untaxed 
jurisdictions and markets. Unfortunately for the Commission these same concerns were shared 
by so many other EU member governments that in the end only a minority number, 11 out of 
the total of 27, are prepared to proceed with the implementation of an FTT in 2014. In light of 
this development, the Commission decided in February, 2013, to withdraw its original proposal 
for an EU wide FTT and replace it with a proposal for “enhanced cooperation in the area of 
financial transaction tax amongst the EU members who support this tax” (2013).  It is made 
clear that the new “proposal is based on the Commission’s original proposal of 2011 in that it 
respects all the essential principles thereof” (2013, p.5). However, some adaptations had to be 
made. Thus to take account of the “new context of enhanced cooperation”, it is now proposed 
that the “FTT jurisdiction be limited to participating Member States” (ibid.). Furthermore, to 
help assuage fears that taxable transactions will be redirected to untaxed jurisdictions, it is 
proposed to complement the residence principle with an ‘issuance principle”, the principle that 
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even financial institutions based in non-FTT jurisdictions will be subject to the FTT when they 
trade in financial instruments that are issued in FTT jurisdictions.  
 
In persisting with the FTT despite substantive opposition within the EU over feasibility, the 
Commission has shown the extent to which it considers this particular tax to be the most 
desirable method of taxing the financial sector. This is where we disagree with the Commission. 
Recall its claim that the FTT’s decisive advantage over the FAT is that it can achieve two 
objectives simultaneously: market stabilisation in addition to revenue generation. The central 
idea behind this claim is that there is a positive correlation between trading volume and price 
volatility: by reducing the volume of short term trading the FTT can help to reduce price 
volatility, which must in turn help to promote the informational efficiency of the financial 
markets. As the Commission’s Impact Assessment study asserts: “The aspects of dealing with 
risk and behavioural aspects of the FTT relate to the possibility of the FTT to curb speculation, 
noise trading and technical trade, and to decrease market volatility” (2011b,p10). The problem 
with this assertion is that it does not receive unambiguous support either from the empirical 
evidence or from economic theory. While some studies show a positive correlation between 
trading volume and price volatility, others show no correlation while yet others show a negative 
correlation (low trading volume leads to higher price volatility due to ‘market thinning’)6. 
Similarly, while some academic economists favour the imposition of financial transaction taxes 
to curb price volatility, others oppose such taxes on the grounds that high trading volume can 
aid the price discovery process and the efficient allocation of risk.7  
 
In sum, the Commission’s economic case for the FTT is not a powerful one. However, if the 
Commission persists with this tax policy this is in part because the standard economic 
arguments against the FTT also lack sufficient power8. The reason for this is that most of the 
current assessments of the costs and benefits of the FTT only focus on the impact on financial 
market stability that is transmitted via the impact on financial prices while largely ignoring the 
impact on stability that is transmitted via the impact on financial institutions. We take a 
different position. While we accept that a significant amount of short term trading is speculative, 
we also believe that an equally significant amount has nothing to do with speculation and forms, 
instead, an indispensable part of the daily operations of major institutions such as pension and 
                                               
6  See IMF, 2010, for a survey of studies on the impact of an FTT on price volatility. 
7  European Parliament, Crisis Management, Burden-sharing and Solidarity Mechanisms in the EU, 2010 
8  See IMF, 2010, pp.17-20, for a list of objections to the FTT.  For a critique of each of these objections to the 
FTT see Schulmeister, 2011.  
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mutual funds on the one hand and the commercial banks on the other. It thus follows that any 
complete assessment of the costs and benefits of the FTT must also focus on its impact on these 
institutions. Before elaborating on this point it first helps to  briefly survey theoretical accounts 
of security market turnover.  
 
3. Explanations of Security Trading Volume 
It is widely acknowledged that secondary security markets support and even make possible 
primary markets by giving the first investors in a security a way to exit from the investment. In 
this sense the ability to trade on secondary markets is functional regardless of the motive for 
such trading, although of course the importance of this exit possibility might be different for 
different investors. However, while the indirect functionality of secondary markets is generally 
accepted, there is also a general view that much of the observed large volumes of secondary 
market trading is superfluous to this functionality. Part of the explanation for the popularity of 
this view is that it is only recently that financial theorists have begun to pay attention to trading 
volumes, as opposed to their central focus on prices and valuations. Several have commented on 
the puzzle that huge financial market turnovers represent for the general equilibrium theories, 
such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which have provided the paradigmatic account 
of financial markets. Indeed, that equilibrium approach has generated several versions of a “no 
trading theorem,” which shows that the very strong full-information conditions used to 
characterize asset-market equilibrium are incompatible with active trading9. These theorems can 
be seen as counterparts to the Grossman-Stiglitz critique of the efficient market hypothesis: the 
former indicate that on a fully efficient financial market there would be no trading; the latter 
turns the same logic around to show that such a market is itself an impossibility10. If we move 
away from equilibrium accounts of financial trading there are a range of explanations, each with 
a somewhat different status. 
 
(i) We can begin with “noise” or “liquidity” trading, often hypothesized precisely to provide a 
rationale for the existence of some trading within models that are otherwise of the general 
equilibrium type. An analogy, within a completely bank-based financial system, would be 
withdrawals or deposits driven by unforeseen changes in the circumstances of the account-
holders. This type of transaction is clearly functional but of limited explanatory significance. It 
                                               
9  For example, Milgrom, P. and Stokey, N, (1982)  
10  S.J. Grossman and J.E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, American 
Economic Review, June 1980, Vol. 70 Issue 3, p393,  
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would be relevant to trades by institutional investors that are driven by sales or purchases by 
retail customers. 
 
(ii) Price discovery is an essential function of financial markets and typically agents who have 
collected costly information would seek a reward through trading at prices that they now judge 
to be obsolete. As such trades take place the prices of the relevant assets are corrected. Although 
this is clearly absolutely necessary for financial markets to work at all, it can have dysfunctional 
aspects. The key incentives may not be simply to discover relevant information but to do so a 
few minutes earlier than other market participants. The market in fact is working well when 
very small amounts of trading suffice to update valuations and when disclosure rules and rules 
against insider-trading support a flow of publicly available information. 
 
(iii) The term churning can be used to denote the most clearly dysfunctional class of security 
trades – trades undertaken because of, rather than in spite of, the transactions costs involved. It 
may be the case that political pressure on the fund management sector has greatly reduced this 
kind of abuse but the conflicts of interest which gave rise to it persist. One conclusion that might 
be drawn is that reform proposals have focused too much on wholesale markets and institutional 
structures. One key to a leaner, more effective, financial system is to assert the interests of retail 
customers in the most unambiguous way. 
 
(iv) Although much trading on many financial markets is purely speculative, one cannot 
immediately dismiss all speculative trades as dysfunctional. One key point is that speculation by 
one agent may permit hedging by another. More importantly, the recent investigation of trading 
volumes has had to introduce the problem of differences of opinion.11 Such differences can 
explain trading, particularly after events which are interpreted in different ways by different 
market participants. Here is a good example of the tension between Walrasian and Austrian 
views of market processes. The Walrasian conception, accepting that market efficiency has 
logically to refer to market outcomes, postulates an idealized unanimity: rational agents with the 
same information must reach the same conclusions – even if they began with different priors. 
The Austrian conception on the other hand, which works with the possibly incoherent notion of 
markets as an efficient process, would take a diametrically opposite position: one key strength 
of markets is that they provide an arena in which different points of view can confront each 
other and a laboratory in which conflicting theories can be put to the test.  
                                               
11  Varian (2000), Difference of Opinion and the Volume of Trade 
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(v) The explanation that will be stressed in this paper is portfolio balancing, which is probably 
the main driver of trading by the institutional investors. It might be thought that a passive 
investment portfolio is self-balancing, but such a view itself derives from inappropriate 
equilibrium assumptions. O’Hara has pointed out that an enormous volume of trading would be 
needed even to replicate one of the well-known stock market indices.12 In practice, institutional 
investors will hold only a sample of the stocks constituting a specific market but this means that 
they have to trade continuously to maintain the representative nature of their portfolios.  This 
observation implies that the conventional distinction between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ portfolio 
management as one that is synonymous with the distinction between no trading (‘buy and hold’ 
investors) and intensive trading (‘buy and sell’ investors) is no longer valid. Rather, both forms 
of portfolio management involve intensive trading with the difference now merely being in the 
scale of intensity. What this means is that only by reversing the ongoing trend towards index 
benchmarking can there be a significant reduction in the volume of portfolio rebalancing 
transactions. However, this is unlikely to happen for reasons to be discussed in the next section.    
 
4. Capital market taxes and the asset management function. 
When one looks at recent trends in equity market trading one can understand why the 
Commission  has singled out high frequency trading (HFT) for special attention when making 
its case for the FTT. As can be seen in figure 2, while trading volumes in the world’s largest 
equity markets grew steadily between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s, there was a sharp 
upward spike in volumes after this point before they again fell after the financial crisis.  There is 
no doubt that this upward spike was in large part caused by the advent of high frequency 
trading. Although the electronification of securities trading dates from the early 1970s with the 
formation of NASDAQ in the US, it was not until the 1990s that securities trading in the EU 
area began to grow in fully automated exchanges and it is not until the mid-2000s that HFT 
became established as a significant proportion of automated trading (Gomber et.al.2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
12  Maureen O’Hara, “Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery,” Journal of Finance, Vol LVIII, No 
4, August 2003.  
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Figure 2 
Share Trading % of Domestic Market Capitalisation 
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Total US Eurozone EU-27 Japan
 
Source: ECMI (2011) 
 
We make two concessions here. First, that HFT is purely speculative in nature as can be seen 
from the list of its defining characteristics presented in the bottom right box in figure 3, and, 
second, that the imposition of the FTT will certainly help to curb HFT. However, we also ask 
two questions that are never raised by the Commission. The first is what is the percentage share 
of high frequency trading out of all automated trading? The commission’s proposal for the FTT 
gives the impression that HFT is the dominant form of automated trading, but while this may be 
true in the US where current estimates are that HFT account for 50 to 55% of all automated 
trading, the remainder comprising of algorithmic trading, the estimates for the EU are that 
algorithmic trading continues to account for the majority share of automated trading, 70 to 75% 
(Valiante and Lanoo, 2011, p.36) 
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Figure 3 
Algorithmic versus High Frequency Trading 
 
Source: Gomber et.al. ( 2011) 
 
The second  question is who are the agents engaging in algorithmic and high frequency trading 
respectively? The fact that the Commission singles out HFT for special mention when 
discussing automated trading may give the impression that its other important subset, 
algorithmic trading, is not all that different from HFT either in terms of the trading players 
involved or in terms of the central trading purpose. This impression is wrong. While algorithmic 
trading and HFT have several common characteristics by virtue of being subsets of automated 
trading (as shown in the top half of figure 3) the differences between these two subsets are more 
important because they relate to two contrasting types of financial function performed by two 
contrasting types of financial institution. Where HFT is speculative trading conducted primarily 
by hedge funds and other proprietary trading vehicles, algorithmic trading is portfolio trading 
conducted by institutional asset managers and in particular by the mutual funds. As the latter 
have a fairly long history one may well wonder why it is relatively recently that they have 
begun to use algorithmic forms of trading on so comprehensive a scale. The answer lies in the 
new pressures on fund managers as much as in technological advances. Algorithmic trading, 
like HFT, is a recent phenomenon but while  new computerised techniques have enabled its 
development it is the structural changes in the fund management industry that have been its 
chief motivation.  
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It is a general rule that whenever an industry grows in scale there is a corresponding shift 
towards more standardized forms of provision in order to accommodate increased demands 
while containing costs. The fund management industry is no exception. In place of the broad 
based and discretionally managed portfolio that was previously the norm, what is now more 
typical is the narrow portfolio managed to a particular investment target.  Indexation strategies 
are at the heart of the new approach to fund management, for it is by taking a market or sub-
market index as a benchmark, while varying tracking error limits, that a portfolio can assume 
the form of a standardized product carrying a specified set of risk-return characteristics. The 
advantages arising out of the separation and narrowing of portfolios are two-fold: on the one 
hand there is better ‘risk-conservation’ as each additional unit of risk is matched more closely to 
a corresponding unit addition of return; on the other hand there is a more accurate measure of 
managerial performance because it may be easier to assess this performance and avoid 
confusing high returns based on risk from those which reflect superior knowledge and 
judgement.  These advantages apply to all large institutional investors but they are especially 
significant for mutual funds that have to cater for both institutional and retail clients.  
 
The rise in algorithmic trading closely ties in with the increasing standardization of fund 
management because it helps managers to resolve a trading dilemma that has become 
particularly acute with this development. On the one hand trading for portfolio balancing 
purposes has greatly intensified: where trading was previously an exogenous activity in that 
while required to set up a portfolio it was not subsequently necessary to the latter’s 
maintenance, trading has now become an endogenous activity, necessary for keeping a portfolio 
to a specified investment target. Algorithmic trading facilitates this need for constant portfolio 
rebalancing by helping to speed up the execution of institutional orders. On the other hand, 
trading can be very costly even while it is unavoidable: the trading of large institutional orders 
can cause price disturbances that then create opportunities for poachers to front-run the orders 
and thereby raise trading costs. Institutional investors have traditionally sought to minimize the 
price impact of their trades by slicing large ‘parent’ orders into many smaller ‘child’ orders that 
are then fed through the exchanges. Algorithmic trading facilitates this price impact 
minimization by helping managers to determine how best to slice large orders into smaller 
orders and where best to execute these orders.  In sum, algorithmic trading is ‘portfolio-
serving’, trading to keep a portfolio to its benchmark, in contrast to high frequency trading that 
is ‘self-serving’, trading purely aimed at making a profit. However, a further important point to 
note here is that HFT is not only fundamentally antithetical to algorithmic trading but is also 
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parasitic on the latter. Where institutional asset managers typically engage in algorithmic 
trading to avoid price volatility and thus avoid giving profitable opportunities to poachers, the 
hedge funds and other speculative vehicles on the contrary are the poachers and engage in HFT 
precisely in order to feed off any price volatility caused by institutional trading. This is why 
HFT concentrates on large cap liquid securities, those that dominate the indexes used by the 
mutual and pension funds as their benchmarks, and this is why hedge funds place their 
computers in close proximity to those used by the mutual funds in the major trading venues.  
 
The conclusion from the above discussion is that the imposition of the FTT in the secondary 
equity markets would be self defeating. The tax would certainly succeed in curbing HFT but in 
doing so it will also harm algorithmic trading on which HFT is parasitic. To use an analogy, it is 
like giving a pet dog that has fleas so strong a medicine that it also kills the dog: effective but 
pointless. It could of course be argued that this negative side effect may be a price worth paying 
if HFT volumes can be significantly reduced. However, this argument would only hold if the 
current trends in portfolio management that give rise to algorithmic trading as an indispensable 
activity were themselves not an irreversible aspect of the contemporary European financial 
landscape. The reality is that they are. The greater the pressures on government finances, which 
have been further severely stretched by the financial crisis, the greater are the government 
incentives to force increasing numbers of middle and higher income households to make their 
own arrangements for supplementary pension and other welfare provision. The greater the drive 
towards welfare arrangements focussed on protecting lower-income groups and moving them 
towards median positions, the greater will be the corresponding demands made upon the asset 
management industry and the greater therefore is this industry’s drive towards standardization 
as a means of coping with these demands. The upshot is that algorithmic trading is set to 
continue to expand in importance given the ongoing shift towards standardization and the 
benchmarking of portfolios and given the necessity of trading to index benchmarking. If it is 
still the intention to constrain HFT,  a far better approach for doing so without hindering 
algorithmic trading is to directly subject this form of trading and the principal institutions 
engaging in it to stricter regulatory controls.  
 
In pointing to the irreversibility of algorithmic trading and of the structural changes in the fund 
management sector with which it is associated our aim is not to idealize this sector  or to suggest 
that the interests of the institutional investors always coincide with those of the retail customers. 
We recognize that pressure from both legislators and the public alike have recently compelled 
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them to lower their costs and adopt more efficient procedures.  We recognize also the 
importance of the Commission’s own contribution to this development as attested by its 
undertakings in collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) directives that stretch 
back to 1986 and by its two directives on markets in financial instruments (MiFIDs 1 and 2). 
Our argument rather, is that the move towards leaner financial intermediation, more closely 
aligned with customer interests, is one that will inevitably increase rather than reduce security 
trading because intensive trading is a key component of this more efficient model. This is why 
we believe that the Commission’s decision to push ahead with FTT as its preferred method for 
taxing the financial sector is in the end profoundly contradictory, for having done everything to 
promote financial market reform it then proposes to introduce precisely the one type of tax that 
would be an obstacle to that reform.    
 
5. Money market taxes and the banking function. 
Trading volumes in the money markets, like those in the capital markets, have in recent decades 
grown at rates far in excess of what can be meaningfully explained in terms of real sector 
activities for which reason the Commission has proposed to bring all money market instruments 
under the scope of the FTT. In our view, this proposal is wrong because the growth of money 
market trading, while having relatively little to do with the pressures on the banking function 
emanating from the product markets, has on the contrary everything to do with the pressures on 
that function emanating from the securities markets. The rapid development and international 
integration of the money markets is a direct consequence of the increased role of institutional 
investors and the accompanying shift away from classical bank intermediation towards greater 
use of the security markets. It is important to recognise that this shift is not going to be reversed 
by current regulatory reforms; we are not about to move to small-scale financial systems of 
Arcadian simplicity. On the one hand such a move would fragment financial systems at a time 
when economic systems are increasingly integrated. On the other hand, tighter regulatory 
constraints on banks will require them to reduce their use of leverage and this in turn will mean 
that they hold fewer long-term assets and make more use of securitisation. The higher capital 
ratios to which the banking system is moving are already making it more advantageous to 
distribute loans via the security markets and disadvantageous to hold them to maturity. Thus 
large banks and security markets will continue to function in symbiosis, with the banks 
performing many functions tied to the security markets and especially supplying the transactions 
balances needed by the agents trading securities. The money market is a key point of tension in 
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this function because of what has been called “the paradox of disintermediation” 13: money is 
less and less held as an asset but is increasingly needed as a means of exchange to support the 
growing volume of security trading. The money market resolves the paradox by accelerating 
monetary circulation to an astonishing degree: huge sums are transferred from bank to bank at 
enormous speed and at very low cost.  
 
Inter-bank transactions essentially take two forms: unsecured (i.e no use of backing collateral) 
and secured (i.e use of backing collateral). As unsecured borrowing involves more risk to 
lenders, this is typically confined to the very shortest of time spans. This said, it should be noted 
that after the recent financial crisis where the trust between banks has become more fragile, the 
proportion of unsecured borrowing and lending activity has fallen in favour of securitised forms 
of activity(see figure 4). The principal form of securitised borrowing is the repo: the sale of 
collateral such as government bonds for cash, and the repurchase of these same bonds with cash. 
Now it is proposed to apply the FTT to repos on the grounds that a) they are ‘transactions’ 
inasmuch as they involve the sale and purchase of securities and b) these transactions are 
typically short term and hence presumably speculative in nature. This is illogical.  Not only did 
the inter-bank money market break down during the crisis but there also subsequently occurred 
an even deeper and more comprehensive breakdown in Europe as a consequence of the 
sovereign debt crisis.  This impairment of the money market can only be aggravated by the 
proposed tax on repo transactions. The suggested rate of 10 basis points is much greater than the 
interest charged on most repos because they are short-run credits meant only to finance rapidly 
executed portfolio changes. Indeed, it has been recently estimated by the European Repo 
Council of the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) that the imposition of the FTT 
on repos would cause this market to contract by as much as 66%, a contraction that would make 
it more difficult for financial institutions and companies to raise capital from banks14. Since, as 
was argued in section 3, much of the trading in securities markets is economically functional 
and since increased constraints on the banks will make economies more dependent on these 
markets, the application of the FTT to secured inter-bank loans is likely to be economically 
damaging. 
 
 
 
                                               
13  See Grahl and Lysandrou, 2003. 
14  See Stevenson, 2013 
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Figure 4 
Average daily turnover in various money 
market segments (index: unsecured transaction volume in 2002 = 100) 
 
Source: ECB (2011) 
 
The illogicality in the Commission’s position is further compounded by the fact that it does not 
intend to extend the FTT to cover foreign exchange swaps. These FX instruments, which 
combine spot FX transactions with outright forward transactions,  account for over 50% of all 
daily FX trading that is now in the region of $ 4 trillion. The major users of FX swaps are the 
dealing banks, and one motivation is that these instruments represent a cheap, because 
collateralised, form of borrowing a foreign currency; thus when a eurozone bank wants to 
borrow dollars short term, it is cheaper to do so through an FX swap, selling euros for dollars in 
a spot transaction and repurchasing the euros with dollars in the reverse forward transaction. 
However, a more important reason why banks use FX swaps is that these serve as an alternative 
type of repo: a eurozone bank wanting to borrow euros can either engage in a straightforward 
repo transaction – using government bonds as collateral – or in an FX swap – selling dollars for 
euros and then repurchasing the dollars with euros, the point here being that dollars not 
government securities act as the collateral. Now there is already a perceived tendency to 
supplement ordinary repo transactions with FX swaps on the part of eurozone banks because of 
the increasing shortage of good quality government bonds to serve as collateral. Following the 
introduction of euro, the world’s investors for a time treated all eurozone government bonds as a 
more or less homogenous class  because of the elimination of currency risk, a development that 
became manifest in the narrowing of government yield spreads. With the advent of the 
sovereign debt crisis and the consequent rise in credit risk considerations in the minds of bond 
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investors these yield spreads have again widened as the eurozone government bond market 
again fragmented into heterogeneous groups. Among the best quality government bonds are 
those of the German government but these are in short supply due to the heavy pressure of 
demand from investors seeking a safe haven (according to a recent survey on the European repo 
market (ICMA, 2012), the share of German government bonds as collateral in repo transactions 
fell from 22.4% in June 2011 to 20.7% in June 2012). As a result, the eurozone banks have had 
to find alternative assets to use as collateral, including the US dollar. A measure of the extent to 
which these banks rely on FX swaps less for currency related than for repo type borrowings is 
indicated by the unusually high ratio of inter-dealer FX transactions in the euro area: 64% (67% 
for FX swaps) as compared with a rest of the world average of 39% (ECB, 2010). 
 
Given that the Commission proposes to tax repos but not FX swaps, the use of these instruments 
as alternative credit transactions to the repo will increase further, thus boosting the already large 
FX swap daily volume. This is ironic because the original Tobin tax that gave inspiration to all 
subsequent financial transaction tax proposals was specifically directed at FX transactions but 
here we have a situation where the Commission’s imposition of the FTT on ordinary repos will 
help to swell FX transactions by conferring a tax advantage on them. It was because they 
recognised this anomaly that members of the European Parliament recommended in May 2012 
currency spot transactions be brought under the scope of the FTT15. However, the fact that the 
European Parliament did not vote to also bring FX swaps (or outright forward currency 
transactions) under the scope of the FTT only served to further highlight the inconsistency in the 
Commission’s proposal to tax one form of collateral (repos) but not another (US dollars). This 
inconsistency is the most worrying feature of  the FTT and likely to make it unworkable as an 
EU strategy not only because it would not only further undermine the liquidity of euro-
denominated bond markets but also make the liquidity of the European banking system 
completely dependent on credit conditions in the US. Here is another example of a profound 
contradiction in the Commission’s position, for if one of the major aims of European financial 
integration is to give the European financial sector some degree of independence from credit 
conditions in other regions of the global economy, the proposed FTT would on the contrary 
close down that independence. 
 
                                               
15  European Parliament, legislative resolution of May 23, 2012, and report on the proposal for a Council 
directive of 28 September 2011 on a common system of financial transaction tax. 
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A final important observation to make here is that the weakening of the inter-bank money 
market also has serious implications for the implementation of monetary policy. Monetary 
policy today relies on the existence of an integrated money market which gives the central 
bank’s actions in that market macroeconomic significance. This is one reason the ECB is trying 
to end the exclusion of banking systems in the periphery from the money market – until it does 
so the transmission of monetary policy decisions will be partial and uneven. Indeed, if integral 
money markets cannot be restored then monetary policy will be ineffective. In the first instance 
the central bank will have to engage in separate negotiations with each fraction of the divided 
market and have to judge what the effect of this multiplicity of individual interventions will be. 
But further, as Hicks pointed out16, the efficacy of monetary policy depends on the existence of 
an elastic supply of credit; monetary policy affects the terms on which that credit is issued. If 
banks and other financial corporations find that credit is not available, then they will accumulate 
big money balances to reduce the risk of not being able to carry out their desired transactions. 
Once financial agents have insulated themselves from the credit system in this way they have 
also insulated themselves against central bank actions – since they are not making substantial 
use of the money market, changes in money market conditions have no certainclear impact on 
their own strategies. 
 
To summarise, the proposed application of the FTT to repo transactions has three very 
undesirable effects. Firstly, it will intensify the contractionary effects of the FTT on security 
market trading by impeding inter-bank transactions.  Secondly, it will promote the use of dollars 
rather than euro-denominated securities in the functioning of EU money markets, thereby 
undermining EU autonomy. Thirdly, by fragmenting short-run credit markets it will 
obstructprevent the effective implementation of monetary policy that requires all financial 
agents to be integrated into a unified system.  Any one of these effects is damaging, but to 
introduce a measure that impairs the EU money markets in all three ways comes close to 
vandalism.           
 
6. Strategic and Policy Implications 
As previously noted, most of the economists who have addressed the subject of the FTT have 
directed attention to its impact on financial prices rather than to its impact on financial 
institutions. Had they done the latter, it is doubtful whether any of them could have given 
                                               
16  The Crisis in Keynesian Economics 
  See e.g. Lysandrou, 2012 
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serious support to this form of taxing the financial sector. However, the fact that they continue 
to be preoccupied with the impact on financial prices helps to explain why they are deeply 
divided over the implementation of the FTT. Although there are many economists of high 
standing who are strongly opposed to this tax, there are also many economists of equally high 
standing who strongly support it as can be seen by scrolling down the names of the 1,000 
economists from 53 countries who petitioned the G20 meeting of finance ministers in April 
2011 to implement the FTT17. Given that the economics profession remains divided over the 
FTT, it follows that political considerations must figure as heavily as economic ones behind the 
Commission’s determination to press ahead with a European FTT.  
 
The key political problem is the conflict between strong popular demands for a tax on banks and 
the equally strong opposition to any form of bank taxation mounted by the banks themselves. 
The Commission appears to have decided that the FTT represents the most judicious way of 
resolving this conflict. On the one side, the FTT has received backing not only from major EU 
member governments such as those of France and Germany but also from a wide array of non-
governmental organisations and interest groups for whom the FTT has become identified as a 
‘Robin Hood tax’, that is, as a tax that has a redistributive and hence moral appeal in addition to 
any technical advantages. On the other side, the FTT represents less of a threat to banks’ 
interests as compared with a FAT. This is not only because the FAT is a direct tax on bank 
profits unlike the FTT that taxes trading activities that only form part of the source of profits. It 
is also because the FAT can be focussed on specific institutions unlike the FTT that 
indiscriminately affects all types of institution engaging in the transactions that are subject to 
this tax. The banks, as explained, may be the institutions most affected by a FTT in the money 
markets, but in the capital markets where it is the large fund managers who do most of the 
trading it is these non-bank institutions that will be most affected. In the end, the banks prefer 
the FTT as the least threatening form of taxation because they know that that it will not work 
and that it will be eventually repealed not only because of the refusal of the UK and other EU 
national authorities to implement the tax but also because of the very strong objections to it that 
are raised by the European fund management industry on account of its negative impact on 
portfolio rebalancing transactions. An early measure of the strength of these objections was the 
European Pparliaments’ recommendation in May 2012 to exempt pension funds from the FTT 
in direct opposition to the Commission’s view that such a move would violate the principle of a 
level playing field for all fund managers. Aside from the complaints of being unfairly treated, 
                                               
17  See Stewart, 2011 
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however, there are two further reasons why the mutual fund and insurance company sectors will 
raise strong objections to the FTT. 
 
The first is that the fund management sector neither caused the financial crisis nor benefitted 
from any of the government financial assistance that was given in the aftermath of the crisis. 
While certain non-bank financial institutions, notably the hedge funds, may have been to some 
extent complicit in precipitating the subprime crisis that subsequently mutated into a full blown 
financial crisis18, the pension and mutual fund sector could reasonably argue that their role in 
that initial  crisis was more that of the victim than that of the perpetrator. The second reason for 
this sector’s opposition to the FTT is that short term trading was not a root cause of the last 
financial crisis and thus its curtailment will not necessarily help to prevent a future financial 
crisis. The Commission has argued that the FTT would “ complement regulatory measures 
aimed at avoiding future crises” (2011a, p.2)  but the fact is that trading played no major role in 
the last financial crisis. The products at the epicentre of the initial subprime phase of the crisis 
were CDOs, credit instruments that were so complex and opaque in structure that they could not 
be easily traded and priced according to any market standard. Indeed, it was precisely because 
they were difficult to price and consequently difficult to trade that these products helped to 
precipitate the breakdown in trust between banks that in turn caused the money and interbank 
markets to freeze up completely in August, 2007. In this second phase of the financial crisis, 
trading was again to play no major role. Rather, that role belonged to the huge asset-liability 
mismatches of the bank owned conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs). Thus while 
it was indeed the case that the ‘particularly risky behaviour’ on the part of the banks and other 
segments of the financial markets was a root cause of the financial crisis, that risky behaviour 
had less to do with financial trading than with excessive leverage and capital inadequacy. 
 
The above observations mean that the Commission’s logic behind the Commission'sits choice of 
the FTT as the preferred means of taxing the European financial sector can be stood on its head. 
If the intention behind a European financial tax is not only to force financial institutions to bear 
some of the costs of the last financial crisis but also to force changes in their behaviour so as to 
prevent a future financial crisis then it is not the FTT but the FAT that is superior. The 
explanation is clear. If it is the prospect of distributing huge financial profits in the form of 
generous salaries and bonuses that is the chief motivation for excessive leverage and other types 
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of excessive risk taking in the financial sector, then it must follow that the most effective way of 
dealing with this problem is to tax financial profits before they can be privately distributed.  
 
7.Conclusion 
There is a widely held view that as long as the banks are taxed to help repay some of the vast 
sums of taxpayers’ money they have absorbed since the crisis, it does not really matter what 
type of tax policy is applied. This paper has argued that it does matter enormously. Apply the 
wrong tax and the objective of getting the banking sector to shoulder its part of the post-crisis 
financial burden will ultimately fail. The better tax is the financial activities tax because the 
better strategy for raising public revenues is to tax the immense private fortunes that have been 
accumulated by the very same abuse of financial and corporate power that has rendered 
democratic governments insolvent. It is hard to deny that a FAT would perform this necessary 
redistributive function far more effectively than a FTT or that, together with a reassertion of 
consumer and broader social priorities, a FAT would represent a far more effective contribution 
to the reconstruction of the financial system.    
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